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Abstract
Like many stocks, the Pacific Bluefin Tuna Thunnus orientalis has been considerably depleted. High exploitation
rates on very young fish have reduced the spawning stock biomass (SSB) to 2.6% of the unexploited level. We provide
a framework for exploring potential benefits of minimum size regulations as a mechanism for rebuilding stocks, and
we illustrate the approach using simulations patterned after Pacific Bluefin Tuna dynamics. We attempt to mitigate
short-term losses in yield by considering a phased-in management strategy. With this approach, the minimum size
limit (MSL) is gradually increased as biomass rebuilds, giving fishing communities time to adjust to new restrictions.
We estimated short- and long-term effects of different MSLs on yield and biomass by using data from the 2016
assessment. A variety of scenarios was considered for growth compensation, discard mortality, and interest rates. The
long-term value of the fishery was maximized by setting an MSL of 92 cm FL, which resulted in a 70% loss in yield
during the first year (short-term pain). By implementing the MSL in two phases (64 cm FL in year 1; 92 cm FL in
subsequent years), the long-term value of the fishery was maintained, and the short-term pain was reduced to a maxi-
mum 46% loss in yield during any 1 year. Under a three-phase implementation (55 cm FL in year 1; 77 cm FL in
year 2; and 92 cm FL in subsequent years), the short-term pain was further reduced to a maximum loss of 30%
during any 1 year. With no discard mortality, long-term yield increased by 165% and SSB increased 13-fold (to 33%
of virgin SSB), regardless of the number of phases used. Long-term benefits were quickly diminished with increasing
discard mortality. This simulation approach is widely applicable to cases where minimum size changes are contem-
plated; for Pacific Bluefin Tuna, our simulations demonstrate that size limits should be considered.
Minimum size limits (MSLs) have been widely used as a
management tool to limit fishing pressure, increase yield
per recruit, and prevent recruitment overfishing by allowing
a larger number of fish to reach sexual maturity (Wood-
ward and Griffin 2003; Froese et al. 2016). Less often,
MSLs have also been used in a rebuilding context to aid in
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the recovery of overfished stocks, such as Hogfish Lachno-
laimus maximus (NOAA 2017a), Gray Triggerfish Balistes
capriscus (NOAA 2017b), Swordfish Xiphias gladius
(NOAA 1999), and Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Thunnus thynnus
(Fromentin et al. 2013). Size limits have been shown to be
particularly effective for relatively long-lived, slow-growing,
late-maturing species with short spawning durations
because these species require a large spawning stock reserve
and a protracted age structure to persist (Fromentin and
Fonteneau 2001; Secor 2007). Size limits are also particu-
larly attractive for managing highly migratory species
(Venizelos et al. 2003; Neilson et al. 2013; Trzcinski and
Bowen 2016), as they require no spatial or temporal control
of catch and effort. However, MSLs work under the
assumption that undersized fish can be avoided or that their
postrelease mortality rates are negligible. Violating this
assumption can substantially influence the success of the
regulation (Coggins et al. 2007; Pine et al. 2008). In this
paper, we develop an analytical framework for examining
trade-offs between conservation and yield after the imple-
mentation of a minimum size regulation, and we demon-
strate its application to the Pacific Bluefin Tuna Thunnus
orientalis stock, whose sustainability has been compromised
by high levels of fishing effort on very young fish (ISC
2016a). This example is presented in enough detail to
demonstrate the versatility of the approach. Through simu-
lation, we explore how various assumptions about growth
compensation, discard mortality, tolerance for undersized
fish, and interest rates might affect the success of such a reg-
ulation, and we discuss the implications of our results in the
context of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna fishery. This approach
can be extended to allow for harvest slot limits or har-
vest exclusion slot limits; these are minimum and maximum
size limits between which harvest is either contained
(i.e., all harvest is in the slot) or excluded (i.e., no harvest in
the slot).
Prized for its high-quality meat, the Pacific Bluefin Tuna
is one of the most sought-after fishes in the world,
with wholesale prices having routinely fetched upwards of
US$50 per kilogram (Deere 2000; Bayliff et al. 2004). This
species, which consists of a single Pacific-wide stock, is har-
vested throughout its range, with the highest effort occur-
ring in the western North Pacific Ocean (WPO) and eastern
North Pacific Ocean (EPO; ISC 2016a). Historically, the
stock has experienced considerable fluctuations in catch,
ranging from a high of 40,383 metric tons in 1965 to a low
of 8,653 metric tons in 1990. In recent years (2005–2014),
landings have averaged 19,863 metric tons (Sakai et al.
2016). Five principal countries target the stock: Japan (50–
80% of the annual catch), Taiwan, and Korea in the WPO;
and Mexico and USA in the EPO, with catches in the EPO
ranging from just over 40% of Pacific-wide catches in the
mid-1970s to under 15% in the early 2000s and close to 20%
in recent years (Maunder and Aires-da-Silva 2014). The
U.S. purse seine fishery was responsible for a large portion
of catches prior to 1980 (ISC 2016a), but its importance
rapidly declined with the development of the sashimi mar-
ket, as the fishery was not able to meet the demand for
high-quality fish. The implementation of the Mexican
Exclusive Economic Zone in 1976 also contributed to the
reduction of the U.S. purse seine fleet and was followed by
an increase in Mexican purse seine catches (Aires-da-Silva
et al. 2007). Purse seines predominately target juveniles and
are responsible for the majority of the catch annually
(≈70%), while longlines, which target adults, typically
account for less than 10% of the annual catch (ISC 2016b).
Adult Pacific Bluefin Tuna spawn in areas between the
Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines in late spring and in the
Sea of Japan during mid- to late summer (Suzuki et al.
2014). At age 0, juveniles stay close to the location where
they were spawned; by the end of their first year, they begin
to expand their range into neighboring waters. At age 1 or
2, a portion of the population migrates to the western coast
of the USA and Mexico (Itoh et al. 2003), where they gen-
erally reside for 1–2 years and up to 7 years before return-
ing to the WPO to spawn (age at 50% maturity = 4 years;
Bayliff et al. 1991; Boustany et al. 2010; ISC 2016a; Madi-
gan et al. 2017). Within the EPO, Pacific Bluefin Tuna are
targeted by both commercial and recreational fishers, and a
portion of the catch is brought back to Mexican grow-out
pens, where fish are kept for a few weeks to a few months
(but not longer than 6 months) before being sold when mar-
ket conditions are favorable (Volpe 2005; Robadue and Del
Moral Simanek 2007).
Though historical data indicate that juveniles have
always dominated the catch of Pacific Bluefin Tuna, the
fishery experienced a sharp increase in the catch of age-0
fish starting in 1990. The year 1990 coincided with an
unusually high recruitment event that sparked the develop-
ment of WPO purse seine fisheries specifically targeting
age-0 and age-1 fish (Maunder and Aires-da-Silva 2014;
Maunder et al. 2014). In 1994, the stock experienced a
second peak in recruitment, maintaining high catches for
a few more years. However, since 1994, the stock has not
been able to produce such high levels of recruitment, and
in the past 10 years, recruitment has reached near histori-
cal lows. Another major development in the Pacific Blue-
fin Tuna fishery occurred in the early 2000s, when large
Japanese purse seiners, which had historically targeted
mackerels and sardines in the Sea of Japan, shifted their
effort toward Pacific Bluefin Tuna after the depletion of
those stocks (Sanada 2015). Today, high levels of effort
persist, with more than 90% of the catch (in numbers)
comprising age-0 and age-1 fish (ISC 2016a). Results from
the latest stock assessment indicate that Pacific Bluefin
Tuna spawning stock biomass (SSB) is presently at 2.6%
of unexploited levels (ISC 2016a) and is composed almost
entirely of one strong cohort (Maunder et al. 2014).
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The historical increase in effort after the expansion of
purse seine fisheries and the consequential shift toward tar-
geting smaller or younger fish are not particular to the Paci-
fic Bluefin Tuna fishery. Other closely related species,
including Yellowfin Tuna Thunnus albacares and Bigeye
Tuna Thunnus obesus, have experienced a similar harvest
pattern (Polacheck 2006; Wang et al. 2009). Recent
increases in the use of fish-aggregating devices have brought
about an increase in the catchability of juvenile Bigeye
Tuna and Yellowfin Tuna, which are caught as bycatch in
the purse seine fishery primarily targeting Skipjack Tuna
Katsuwonus pelamis and adult Yellowfin Tuna (Bailey et al.
2013). Other species with very different life history traits,
such as the Pacific Jack Mackerel Trachurus symmetricus
stock and historical Northern Anchovy Engraulis mordax
fishery off southern California (Mais 1981; Mason 1991),
have also experienced a similar shift in harvest pattern.
Concerns over initial losses in yield resulting from more
conservative management measures can create strong resis-
tance from the fisheries sector and can prevent the imple-
mentation of management actions (Rosenberg 2003;
Rosenberg et al. 2006; Beddington et al. 2007). Using a
gradual approach in which the management measure is
implemented in steps can make the solution more attractive
and more likely to be implemented (Hannesson 1993). This
concept has been studied in the past with ideas of dynamic
adaptive quotas (Ussif and Sumaila 2005) and gradual
implementation of marine reserves through incremental
increases in reserve size, number of species being protected,
or length of time an area is closed to fishing (Brown et al.
2015). Shertzer and Prager (2007) demonstrated, however,
that delaying management can also be risky, as it may
increase the probability of stock collapse, especially for
stocks exhibiting depensation and those whose catchability
(unknown to the assessment) is density dependent and for
which fishing is concentrated on juveniles. In this paper, we
explore ways to lessen the maximum annual loss in yield eli-
cited by the introduction of a minimum size regulation (i.e.,
“short-term pain”). We examined the trade-offs between the
short-term pain and long-term gains and investigated
whether a gradual phasing in of MSLs over several years
might help to reduce short-term losses in yield while gradu-
ally meeting long-term conservation goals.
METHODS
General approach.—An age-structured model with
annual time steps and stochastic recruitment was con-
structed to simulate the impact of various MSLs (0–130 cm
FL) on stock status and fisheries returns over 20 years, with
the ultimate goal of determining the optimal MSL to be
imposed on the fishery. Alternative scenarios with differing
assumptions on tolerance for undersized fish, discard mor-
tality, growth compensation, and interest rates were used to
evaluate the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions
(Figure 1). In each scenario, the short- and long-term man-
agement performance of the regulation was evaluated by
assessing model results for SSB, yield, and economic value
of the fishery (Figure 1). The benefits of introducing the
MSL in phases was also explored—that is, gradually
increasing the MSL over 2 years (two-phase approach) or
3 years (three-phase approach) to reach the optimal long-
term MSL. One-hundred simulation runs were carried out
for each scenario being considered to observe the range of
plausible outcomes given different recruitment histories.
The analysis was performed in R version 3.3 (R Foundation
for Statistical Computing, Vienna).
Input parameters.— Input parameters and results from
the 2016 assessment’s base case scenario were used to
parameterize the model (ISC 2016a; detailed in Table 1).
To adequately account for changes in the age structure of
the population as SSB rebuilds, a plus group of 20 (group-
ing of all age-20 and older fish) was used instead of a plus
group of 10, which was used in the assessment. Estimates
of numbers at age and fishing mortality rates at age were
averaged (geometric mean) over a 5-year reference period
(2010–2014) to provide stability to the estimates and were
used as a starting point for the simulations.
Base case scenario.—At the start of each year, the
numbers-at-age estimates (Na) were divided between
undersized (Na <MSL½ ) and legal-sized (Na MSL½ ) fish
so that the two groups could be projected forward sepa-
rately. A cumulative normal distribution function was
used to calculate the fraction of fish that fell below the
MSL in each age-class (see Figure 2 for size distributions
of cohorts and relationship to MSL). These fractions (Ra)
and their complement (1 − Ra) were then multiplied by
numbers at age to obtain the number of fish correspond-
ing to each group:
Nað<MSLÞ ¼ NaRa (1a)
NaðMSLÞ ¼ Nað1 RaÞ: (1b)
Numbers at age were projected forward by a year (y;
before considering growth) by using an exponential sur-
vival model,
Na;yþ1ð<MSLÞ ¼ Na;yð<MSLÞe Fað<MSLÞþMa½  (2a)
Na;yþ1ðMSLÞ ¼ Na;yðMSLÞeðFaþMaÞ; (2b)
where Ma is the natural mortality rate at age a; Fa is the
fishing mortality rate at age a assuming that no MSL is in
place; and Fa(<MSL) is the fishing mortality rate affecting
fish of age a that are below the MSL. In the base case sce-
nario, it is assumed that the MSL is being strictly enforced
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and that there is zero tolerance for catching undersized
fish; thus, Fa(<MSL) = 0. Any fish of age 20 in year y
that was still alive in year y + 1 was added to the number
of age-20 fish in year y + 1. We also assumed perfect
growth compensation, meaning that the undersized fish
within a specific cohort are advanced to the following year
assuming that they will have the same mean length as the
size distribution for the next age-group. This assumption
was later relaxed (see Alternative scenarios: compensatory
growth).
FIGURE 1. Pacific Bluefin Tuna simulation outline. Dashed lines represent input parameters, circles indicate assumptions, and gray boxes indicate
outputs. Black-filled boxes represent the regulation scenario simulated in the run (MSL = minimum size limit; TB = total biomass; SSB = spawning
stock biomass; DFR = discounted future revenues of the fishery; see equation 7).
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Recruitment (R) was modeled as a first-order autore-
gressive stochastic process about a Beverton–Holt stock–
recruitment relationship,
Ry ¼ 0:8R0hSSBy10:2SSB0ð1 hÞ þ ðh 0:2ÞSSBy1 e
εy0:5σ2R ; (3)
where Ry is recruitment of age-0 fish (in numbers) at the
beginning of year y; R0 and SSB0 are the mean recruit-
ment and SSB, respectively, under unfished conditions;
SSBy–1 is the SSB remaining at the end of the previous
year; and h is the steepness parameter. The recruitment
deviation term εy is expressed as
εy ¼ ρεy1 þ ϕy
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ρ2
p
for y > 1
εy ¼ ϕy for y ¼ 1,

where ρ controls the level of autocorrelation in recruit-
ment deviations; and ϕy∼Nð0; σ2RÞ represents process error
(Wiedenmann et al. 2015; Johnson et al. 2016). Steepness
was set at 0.999; the SD of stochastic errors in recruitment
(σR) was set at 0.6; and the unexploited recruitment (R0)
and SSB0 were set at 13,739,000 fish and 644,466 metric
tons, respectively, to match the values in the stock assess-
ment (ISC 2016a). The autocorrelation coefficient ρ was
set at 0.466, the mean of the predictive distribution for
Perciformes obtained from a recent meta-analysis of
recruitment (Thorson et al. 2014).
At the end of each year, numbers at age of fish above
and below the MSL were added together and multiplied
by the weight at age (assuming perfect growth compensa-
tion) and maturity at age for the next-older age. This
amount was then summed over all ages to obtain SSB. To
place our results in the context of rebuilding the stock,
SSB was also expressed as a percentage of unexploited
condition (%SSB0), with SSB0 obtained from the assess-
ment.
Annual yield (Yldy) was computed as for a type II
(continuous) fishery, with weights at age assumed to be
those at mid-year as follows:
Yldy ¼ ∑20a¼0
h
Na;yð<MSLÞWa;ymidyrð<MSLÞUað<MSLÞ
þNa;yð≥MSLÞWa;ymidyrð≥MSLÞUað≥MSLÞ
i
; (5)
where Wa;ymidyr (<MSL) and Wa;ymidyr (≥MSL) are the aver-
age weights of age-a fish midway through year y that are
TABLE 1. Description of parameters used in the Pacific Bluefin Tuna analysis (ISC 2016a). Parameter values for alternative scenarios are shown in
bold italics.
Parameter type Parameter description Parameter symbol Parameter value(s)
Growth Age a 0–20 + years
Mean asymptotic length L∞ 249.917 cm FL
Brody’s growth coefficient K 0.188 year−1
Theoretical age at a length of zero t0 –0.4217 year
Coefficient of variation in length
at age
CVa CV0 = 0.26, CV1 = 0.18,
CV2 = 0.10, CV320 = 0.04
Level of growth compensation γ 0 (0.5, 1.0)
Length–weight
relationship
Regression coefficient α 1.7117 × 10−5
Exponent β 3.0382
Mortality Natural mortality rates at age Ma M0 = 1.6, M1 = 0.39, M2þ = 0.25
Fishing mortality rates at age Fa F0 = 0.65, F1 = 0.82, F2 = 0.60,
F3 = 0.20, F4 = 0.22, F5 = 0.18,
F6 = 0.15, F7 = 0.15, F8 = 0.12,
F9 = 0.17, F10-20 = 0.15
Maturity and
recruitment
Proportion mature at age a Pma Pm02 = 0, P
m
3 = 0.2, P
m
4 = 0.5,
Pm520 = 1.0
Unexploited spawning stock biomass SSB0 644,466 metric tons
Unexploited recruitment R0 13,739,000 fish
Steepness h 0.999
Autocorrelation coefficient ρ 0.466
Variability in recruitment σR 0.6
Undersized fish Tolerance for undersized fish t 0% (1–50%)
Discard mortality rate d 0% (1–100%)
Economic factors Interest rate I 2.5% (0%, 5%)
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below and above the minimum size, respectively (calcu-
lated by converting lengths to weights and taking the
means of the truncated distributions of weight at age cre-
ated by the size limit); and Ua(<MSL) and Ua(≥MSL) are
the exploitation rates affecting age-a fish that are below
and above the MSL, calculated from the Baranov catch
equation as
Uað<MSlÞ ¼ Fað<MSLÞFað<MSLÞ þMa f1 e
½Fað<MSLÞþMag
(6a)
Uað≥MSLÞ ¼ FaFa þMa ½1 e
ðFaþMaÞ: (6b)
Net overall economic gain was defined as the dis-
counted future revenues of the fishery n years after imple-
mentation (DFRn). It was calculated by summing annual
fishery values over the years and discounting future values
according to an interest rate (I) using the conventional
equation,
DFRn ¼ ∑ny¼1
Vy
ð1þ IÞy1 ; (7)
where Vy is the value of the fishery in year y, calculated
by multiplying the yield in year y by the price per kilo-
gram (round weight) of fish caught. An I of 2.5% was
chosen for the base case scenario, an appropriate rate for
discounting near-future gains like those measured here
(Weitzman 2001). The price per kilogram of fish was set
to $12, reflecting the whole-weight price of U.S. exports of
Pacific Bluefin Tuna averaged over the period 2003–2013
(NOAA 2014). The economics of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna
fishery are undoubtedly more complicated than is sug-
gested by equation (7). A variety of factors influences
Pacific Bluefin Tuna value: from meat quality (resulting
mainly from the method of capture, slaughtering process,
and storage conditions; Jerret et al. 1996; Addis et al.
2009; Secci et al. 2011; Torrieri et al. 2011) and fat con-
tent (typically linked to fish size, catch location, time of
year, and fattening process, in the case of ranched tunas;
Carroll et al. 2001; Mourente et al. 2001; Ottolenghi 2008;
Go~ni and Arrizabalaga 2010) to fishing costs and avail-
ability. However, our intention was not to provide a
detailed economic assessment of the regulation; rather, we
sought to provide a number that could be looked at in rel-
ative terms when comparing the performance of the regu-
lation under various scenarios. To that end, economic
gains are presented in the Results as a percent change in
DFR 20 years after implementation of the MSL compared
to having no size regulations in place (%ΔDFR20). Once
the range of possible minimum size regulations was
explored, the optimal MSL was determined as that which
produced the highest DFR over 20 years. Other factors,
such as the SSB achieved and the loss in yield and value
immediately after implementation of the regulation, were
also examined.
The 20-year time frame was chosen to afford the popu-
lation of Pacific Bluefin Tuna enough time to reach equi-
librium. In the United States, the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act amendments to the Magnuson–Stevens Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 mandate
that federally managed species that have been declared
overfished must be rebuilt to levels that support maximum
sustainable yield in as short a time as possible, not to
exceed 10 years. This rule is made more flexible in the
case of internationally managed species like bluefin tunas,
for which the socioeconomic background and the stock
life history characteristics can be used as grounds to argue
for longer rebuilding periods (Pilling et al. 2016). For the
Atlantic Bluefin Tuna and Southern Bluefin Tuna Thunnus
maccoyii—the two species most closely related to Pacific
Bluefin Tuna—the rebuilding time frames were established
based on the mean generation time of the stocks, since it
takes at least one generation for the impacts of manage-
ment actions to be fully realized. As such, rebuilding pro-
grams were built on an approximately 20-year time frame,
which justifies the use of a 20-year projection in this
study.
Alternative scenarios: compensatory growth.—Compen-
satory growth, the process by which individual growth
FIGURE 2. Relationship between Pacific Bluefin Tuna length at age
(mid-year) for three illustrative cohorts and five minimum size limits
(MSLs). Dashed line overlaid on top of the length-at-age curves
represents the length–weight relationship. The horizontal and vertical
lines show how MSLs relate to weight (e.g., a minimum size of 90 cm
FL corresponds to a minimum weight of around 15 kg and affects nearly
all age-0 and age-1 fish and a small portion of age-2 fish).
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rates increase as a response to more favorable conditions
(in this case, the removal of the largest fish in a cohort), is
believed to occur in a variety of fishes (Rose et al. 2001;
Ali et al. 2003; Hazlerigg et al. 2012). For Southern Blue-
fin Tuna, Polacheck et al. (2004) linked changes in growth
rates to changes in juvenile abundance over time, suggest-
ing that density dependence could be one of the mecha-
nisms behind observed changes in growth over time. This
mechanism has also been shown to increase SSB growth
rates in depleted groundfish populations, helping to accel-
erate the speed of stocks’ recovery (Morgan et al. 2016).
It is likely that some level of compensation occurs in the
growth rate of Pacific Bluefin Tuna, but the degree to
which this mechanism takes place remains unknown. In
the base case scenario, full compensation was assumed:
the undersized fish within a specific cohort had the normal
size distribution about the von Bertalanffy curve when
they reached the next age. However, full compensation in
growth is likely to be overly optimistic, so for the alterna-
tive scenarios, the average lengths of fish (beginning of the
year for biomass calculations; middle of the year for yield
calculations) were adjusted on a yearly basis to account
for both a lack of compensation and partial compensation
in growth.
Lack of compensation was modeled using the growth
function described by Methot (2000), which was a modifi-
cation of the von Bertalanffy growth equation (as parame-
terized by Schnute 1981) made to account for size-specific
survivorship caused by fishery size-selectivity,
Lyþ1;aþ1 ¼ πy;afLy;a þ ½Ly;a  L∞ðΠaβ¼0πyaþβ;βÞðeK  1Þg;
(8a)
where Ly,a is the mean length of age-a fish in year y; πy,a
is the ratio of the mean size of age-a fish that survived to
the end of year y (i.e., [{numbers at age of undersized
fish × mean length at age of undersized fish} + {numbers
at age of legal-sized fish × mean length at age of legal-
sized fish}]/total numbers at age) to the mean size of age-a
fish present at the beginning of year y; and K is the
growth coefficient that describes the rate of approach to
the asymptotic length (L∞) toward which the cohort is
growing. This function includes an adjustment (π) to both
the mean size at age in any 1 year (πy,a) and L∞ through
the cumulative effect of the different π values experienced
by a specific cohort over the years (∏aβ¼0 πyaþβ;β; the β
index is used here to loop over all of the ages through
which each cohort has gone).
The equation was modified here to allow for partial
compensation by raising π to the power of γ (0 < γ < 1),
Lyþ1;aþ1¼ πγy;afLy;aþ½Ly;aL∞ðΠaβ¼0πγyaþβ;βÞðeK 1Þg:
(8b)
An intermediate value of γ = 0.5 was chosen to repre-
sent partial compensation in growth. At the extremes, a
value of γ = 1 leaves the equation unchanged, thus repre-
senting a lack of compensation in growth; a value of γ = 0
makes the equation revert back to a simple von Bertalanffy
growth equation, thus representing full compensation as in
the base case scenario.
Alternative scenarios: tolerance for undersized fish and
discard mortality.— Fishing mortality rates affecting fish
below the MSL were modified to account for (1) situa-
tions where the regulation would allow a certain level of
fishing mortality on undersized fish (expressed as a toler-
ated fraction [t] of F for each age, where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1);
and (2) discard mortality (d, where 0 ≤ d ≤ 1; the pro-
portion of discards not surviving capture or release,
assumed constant across ages and years). Fishing
mortality rates at age affecting fish below the MSL,
Fa,t,d(<MSL), were expressed in two parts: FHa;tð<MSLÞ,
the fishing mortality rate at age resulting from harvest;
and FDa;t;dð<MSLÞ, the fishing mortality rate at age
resulting from discards,
Fa;t;dð<MSLÞ ¼ FHa;tð<MSLÞ þ FDa;t;dð<MSLÞ (9)
with
FHa;tð<MSLÞ ¼ Fat (10a)
FDa;t;dð<MSLÞ ¼ Fað1 tÞd: (10b)
We approached the issue of discard mortality in two
ways: (1) by assuming that a certain level of discard mor-
tality was occurring in the fishery and accounting for it
when calculating the optimal MSL; and (2) by assuming a
certain level of discard mortality was occurring in the
fishery but not accounting for it when establishing the
regulation (i.e., setting the MSL equal to the optimal
MSL determined under the assumption of 0% discard
mortality).
Alternative scenarios: interest rates.— Interest rates are
inherently variable and difficult to predict. We therefore
tested the sensitivity of the results to both higher (I = 5%)
and lower (I = 0%) interest rates to cover the range of
plausible values (Weitzman 2001).
Alternative scenarios: phases of implementation.—We
explored the short- and long-term impacts of introducing
the MSL in phases—that is, gradually increasing the mini-
mum size over 2 years (two-phase approach) or 3 years
(three-phase approach) to reach the optimal long-term
MSL. Short-term pain was defined as the maximum
annual loss in yield incurred by implementing an MSL,
and long-term gain was defined as the DFR20. We first
determined the optimal MSL for all years (single-phase
approach). For the two-phase approach, the optimal MSL
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in year 1 was chosen as the size that minimized short-term
pain given that the MSL in all subsequent years was the
optimal MSL established in the single-phase approach.
For the three-phase approach, the minimum sizes in years
1 and 2 were searched over a grid given the constraint
that (MSL in year 1) ≤ (MSL in year 2) ≤ (optimal MSL
established in the single-phase approach) and were chosen
as the combination of sizes that minimized the maximum
short-term pain to the fishery.
RESULTS
Base Case Scenario
Simulation results showed that there are large potential
gains to be realized in the long run, both in terms of yield
and SSB, across a wide range of MSLs (Figure 3). The
values are presented as the median of 100 runs
unless otherwise stated. Fifth to ninety-fifth interquartile
ranges are listed in the supplementary material (Supple-
mentary Table S.1 available in the online version of this
article). For the single-phase approach, the optimal MSL
was identified as 92 cm FL. This resulted in an immediate
70% loss in yield in the first year, and losses turned into
gains 4 years into the regulation (Table 2; Figure 3). In
the long run, the optimal minimum size resulted in an
average 165% increase in yield and 13-fold increase in
SSB over 20 years, rebuilding the SSB back to 33% of
SSB0 (Table 2; Figure 3).
Alternative Scenarios
The optimal MSL for the single-phase approach (as-
suming a 0% tolerance level and no discard mortality) was
almost identical across runs, ranging from 86 to 108 cm
FL depending on the assumption made regarding growth
compensation and the annual interest rate (Table 3). This
equated to releasing almost all age-0 and age-1 fish and a
portion of age-2 individuals (Figure 2). Higher compensa-
tion and interest rates generally resulted in slightly lower
MSLs.
FIGURE 3. Effect of minimum size regulation on Pacific Bluefin Tuna spawning stock biomass (SSB) and yield over the 20-year projection
(%SSB0 = SSB expressed as a percentage of unexploited SSB; mt = metric tons). Results are from the base case scenario. Points and whiskers show
the median and 95% tails over the 100 runs, respectively.
TABLE 2. Comparative outcomes of a single-phase approach to establishing minimum size limit (MSL) regulations given different discard mortality
rates for Pacific Bluefin Tuna (%SSB0 = spawning stock biomass [SSB] expressed as a percentage of unfished SSB; %ΔDFR20 = percent change in dis-
counted future revenues of the fishery over a 20-year period after implementation). Three cases are considered: discard mortality is absent from the
fishery (0%); a 20% discard rate is affecting the fishery but is not accounted for when determining the optimal MSL; and a 20% discard mortality rate
is affecting the fishery and is accounted for when determining the optimal MSL. “Rebuilding years” refers to the delay in the time taken by the fishery
to produce yield that exceeds the status quo (i.e., no MSL in place). Median values (first number) and 5th and 95th percentiles (numbers in parenthe-
ses) from the 100 simulations are presented. All other assumptions from the base case scenario were maintained.
Discard mortality MSL (cm)
Short-term losses Long-term gains (20 years)
Maximum loss in yield
in any 1 year (%)
Rebuilding
years
%SSB0
achieved
Percent increase
in yield %ΔDFR20
0% 92 (79, 101) −70 (−75, −60) 4 (2, 5) 33 (22, 51) 165 (64, 281) 82 (71, 91)
20%, not accounted for 92 (79, 101) −70 (−75, −60) 4 (3, 7) 23 (16, 35) 88 (12, 163) 31 (26, 34)
20%, accounted for 74 (72, 77) −56 (−58, −54) 4 (2, 5) 17 (11, 28) 76 (24, 143) 37 (31, 42)
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The magnitude of economic gains (DFR20) did not
vary much across assumptions on interest rate and level of
compensation (Table 3). Gains were highest under an I of
0% and full compensation in growth and were lowest
under a high interest rate and no compensation in growth
(Table 3; Figure 4). Full growth compensation led to
higher economic gains, but the difference in DFR20
between a lack of growth compensation and full compen-
sation was just 2–8% depending on the assumption placed
on interest rates (Table 3; Figure 4). The choice of I had
the largest impact on long-term gains. The DFR20
increased by 10–15% for every 2.5% decrease in I
(Table 3).
The level of tolerance for undersized fish was shown to
substantially affect yield and SSB projections (Figure 5).
For an MSL of 92 cm FL, allowing undersized fish to be
subjected to 20% of the F at age cut potential long-term
gains in yield and SSB by one-third (long-term yield
reached 43,000 metric tons rather than the 55,000
metric tons achieved under the zero-tolerance scenario,
and %SSB0 dropped from 33% to 23%; Figure 5).
Accounting for discard mortality also substantially
affected the results (Figure 6). If discard mortality was
occurring in the fishery but was not accounted for when
selecting the optimal MSL (i.e., choosing a minimum size
of 92 cm for the base case scenario), the result was a
decrease in long-term gains (Figure 6). Under an MSL of
92 cm FL, discard mortality of 20% resulted in a decrease
in long-term economic gains from 82% to 31% and a
reduction in SSB from 33% of SSB0 to 23% of SSB0
(Table 2). It also delayed the time taken by the fishery to
recover and exceed the status quo yield (i.e., no MSL)
from a range of 2–5 years (5th and 95th percentiles) to a
range of 3–7 years (Table 2). If discard mortality was
occurring and considered when selecting the optimal
MSL, the result was a decrease in the optimal MSL (i.e.,
78 cm FL for a 10% discard mortality rate, 74 cm FL for
a 20% discard mortality rate, and 41 cm FL for a 40%
discard mortality rate). Above a 50% discard mortality
rate, there was little benefit to an MSL both in terms of
increasing the value of the landings and rebuilding the
SSB (Figure 6). Accounting for discard mortality in calcu-
lating the optimal size limit resulted in a lower MSL. For
a discard mortality rate of 20%, the optimal MSL
decreased to 74 cm FL (Table 2) and %ΔDFR20 rose
from 31% to 37%, with SSB declining even further to 17%
of SSB0 (Table 2). Thus, accounting for discard mortality
when calculating the optimal MSL did help to recover
some of the increased value, but these measures came at
the cost of reduced conservation benefits, since the lower
MSL chosen did not allow for SSB to achieve as high a
level of rebuilding.
Two- and Three-Phase Approaches
The median optimal MSLs for the two-phase approach
(using assumptions from the base case scenario) were
64 cm FL in year 1 and 92 cm FL in subsequent years
(see Figure 7 for a visual example of the trade-off between
short-term pain and long-term gain when selecting the
optimal MSL in year 1). This maintained the long-term
TABLE 3. Optimal minimum size limits (MSLs) and percent change in
discounted future revenues of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna fishery 20 years
after MSL implementation (%ΔDFR20) across scenarios (assuming 0%
tolerance for undersized fish and 0% discard mortality). Median values
(first number) and 5th and 95th percentiles (numbers in parentheses) from
the 100 simulations are presented. Results from the base case scenario
are highlighted in gray.
Interest
rate (%)
Compensatory
growth
Optimal MSL
(cm FL)
%ΔDFR20
5.0 None 108 (72, 108) 68 (58, 77)
5.0 Partial 103 (75, 106) 70 (62, 78)
5.0 Full 86 (77, 95) 74 (66, 81)
2.5 None 108 (72, 108) 78 (63, 88)
2.5 Partial 104 (75, 106) 79 (67, 89)
2.5 Full 92 (79, 101) 82 (71, 91)
0.0 None 108 (72, 108) 88 (68, 100)
0.0 Partial 106 (75, 106) 89 (72, 101)
0.0 Full 101 (79, 104) 90 (76, 102)
FIGURE 4. Effects of growth compensation on the percent change in
discounted future revenues of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna fishery 20 years
after MSL implementation (%ΔDFR20) as a function of the minimum
size limit (MSL) regulation. Results from the 100 runs are presented. All
other assumptions from the base case scenario were maintained.
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net present value of the fishery to within 1% of the value
observed in the single-phase approach and reduced the
short-term pain from 70% to a 46% maximum loss in
yield in any 1 year (Figure 8; Table S.1). For the three-
phase approach, median optimal MSLs were 55 cm FL in
year 1, 77 cm FL in year 2, and 92 cm FL in year 3 and
subsequent years (see Figure 9 for individual realizations
of the simulation runs). With this approach, the short-
term pain was further reduced to a maximum loss in yield
of 30% compared to the status quo, and long-term gains
were again maintained within 1% of the value observed in
the single-phase approach (Figure 8; Table S.1). Across all
assumptions made on growth, interest rate, and discard
mortality, gradually increasing the MSL over the years
consistently reduced the short-term pain while maintaining
long-term gains in yield, biomass, and profits (Figure 8).
The amount by which short-term losses in yield were less-
ened as a result of phasing in the regulation was also
fairly consistent across assumptions.
DISCUSSION
The question of how much time should be taken to
rebuild SSB is an important one. Rapid reductions in F
are associated with high costs in short-term yield, whereas
slow reductions in F are associated with high risks of
recruitment failure (Rosenberg and Brault 1991). Interme-
diate strategies that dampen short-term losses while still
allowing SSB to rebuild within an acceptable time frame
are ideal (Rosenberg and Brault 1991). Phasing in the
FIGURE 5. Isopleths of Pacific Bluefin Tuna equilibrium spawning stock biomass (SSB) and yield under different minimum size limit (MSL)
regulations and tolerance levels (%SSB0 = SSB expressed as a percentage of unexploited SSB; mt = metric tons). Median values from the 100
simulations are presented. All other assumptions from the base case scenario were maintained.
FIGURE 6. Isopleths of Pacific Bluefin Tuna equilibrium spawning stock biomass (SSB) and yield under different minimum size limit (MSL)
regulations and discard mortality levels (%SSB0 = SSB expressed as a percentage of unexploited SSB; mt = metric tons). Median values from the 100
simulations are presented. All other assumptions from the base case scenario were maintained.
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MSL increases over a 3-year period achieved marked
reductions in short-term losses while still allowing the
stock to rebuild. If the fishing communities were to require
more time to adjust to the new regulation, additional
phases could be added. However, the number of phases
used should be given careful consideration given that any
delay in implementing the optimal MSL will increase the
recovery time frame of the stock and make it more suscep-
tible to collapse (Caddy and Agnew 2004; Shertzer and
Prager 2007). For Pacific Bluefin Tuna, recent low levels
of spawning biomass have been associated with some of
the lowest recruitment events ever observed, so there is
concern that the stock may be—or will soon be—experi-
encing recruitment overfishing (Maunder et al. 2014). Fur-
thermore, given that they are apex predators, Pacific
Bluefin Tuna play a crucial role in the pelagic environ-
ment as important regulators of lower-trophic-level species
(Heithaus et al. 2008). Thus, any further decrease in bio-
mass or delay in rebuilding could seriously compromise
the ecosystem’s health and integrity.
The risk of recruitment failure is, by nature, tightly
linked to the stock–recruitment relationship, which is an
important factor in predicting long-term gains and risks of
stock collapse. The lack of contrast in the estimates of his-
torical SSB and recruitment—coupled with the fact that
the Pacific Bluefin Tuna is a highly productive species—
has led scientists to assume that recruitment is largely
independent of stock size. As a consequence, the point
value chosen for h in the assessment was extremely high
(h = 0.999; ISC 2016a). In an actual application of this
simulation approach to Pacific Bluefin Tuna, one would
want to evaluate alternative values for h, or possibly even
different stock recruitment models, to cover the range of
possible outcomes. It is difficult to predict exactly how
our results would be affected by lower h-values. However,
one can anticipate observing lower recruitment sizes at
lower levels of SSB and a slightly higher value of equilib-
rium recruitment (ISC 2016a). This would translate into
lower yields being observed in the earlier part of the
rebuilding process but larger potential gains to be made in
the long run. Furthermore, having assumed a relatively
large recruitment variability in the simulation means that
our recruitment estimates diverged considerably from the
values predicted by the stock–recruitment model. As such,
a wide range of possible recruitment values was observed
across the various 100 runs of each scenario.
Our simulations suggest that an MSL protecting age-0
to age-2 fish can be beneficial if fishers avoid catching
undersized fish. Since Pacific Bluefin Tuna tend to remain
in schools of similar-sized individuals and since purse
seines can be selective for the size of fish they catch, it
should be possible to target fish of roughly a certain size,
making an MSL a viable option for the fishery. Certain
fleets seldom catch fish smaller than 92 cm (age 2 and
below), such as the Taiwanese longline vessels (ages 5+)
and Japanese longline vessels (ages 3+) operating in the
spawning grounds off Okinawa and Taiwan during sum-
mer months (ISC 2002); for these fisheries, the Pacific
Bluefin Tuna constitutes only a minor fraction of the
catch (Z. Suzuki, National Research Institute of Far Seas
Fisheries, personal communication). Others principally
catch fish smaller than 92 cm, such as the Japanese troll,
pole-and-line, and set-net fisheries (ages 0–2) and the Kor-
ean purse seiners operating in coastal waters (ages 0–1;
ISC 2002). The small pelagic purse seines (Japanese and
Korean), which catch the majority of young Pacific Blue-
fin Tuna, specifically target individuals less than 10 kg or
80 cm FL (Fukuda et al. 2014). The Mexican purse seines
primarily target fish of ages 3–8, and the U.S. purse seines
mainly target age 2 (ISC 2002).
One concern that has been raised about implementing a
Pacific-wide MSL is the unequal distribution of losses and
gains. Since fleets target different age-groups, not all coun-
tries exploiting the stock will be equally affected by a
change in policy. Surface fleets that operate close to shore
and target young fish will see their catches affected the
most. Assuming no shift in targeting, the fleets or
FIGURE 7. Trade-off between short-term pain and long-term gain in
the Pacific Bluefin Tuna fishery given different combinations of minimum
size limit (MSL) regulations in a two-phase approach. Results are shown
for a single realization of the simulation where the optimal MSL in year
1 was 54 cm FL and the optimal MSL in subsequent years was 81 cm
FL. Cell colors correspond to the percent change in discounted future
revenues of the fishery over a 20-year period after implementation
(%ΔDFR20). Negative numbers in cells indicate maximum percentage
loss in yield in any one year. All other assumptions from the base case
scenario were maintained.
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countries that solely target very young fish would bear
most of the hardship without reaping the benefits of a
healthier stock. Conversely, longline fleets targeting larger
individuals will feel none of the pain and reap all of the
gain. A more detailed analysis of the impacts of various
fleets defining the pains and gains of individual fleets falls
beyond the scope of this paper but would be needed to
define a workable management strategy and to measure
the risk associated with choosing a particular MSL and
phased-in strategy. The imposition of an MSL would only
happen on the basis of a negotiated settlement. Such nego-
tiations would likely include measures to prevent effort
from shifting to target larger size-groups as well as the use
of economic incentives to distribute the burden more
evenly among the different fishing sectors. Incentives could
include credit systems (Van Riel et al. 2013), taxes and
subsidies (Gjertsen et al. 2010), or allowing for fishing
nations that will see the benefits of improved stock sizes
to compensate other countries for reduced catches through
side payments.
Introducing an MSL would likely cause fishers who
solely target small Pacific Bluefin Tuna—or those who
already operate on thin margins and thus cannot afford
even the smallest loss of catch—to leave the fishery. How-
ever, those that only incidentally catch small Pacific Blue-
fin Tuna (a minor fraction of the fleets) may not see a
benefit in shifting their operation. If that is the case,
undersized fish may continue to be caught as bycatch, and
if the discard mortality is substantial, this will reduce
potential gains in yield and impede efforts aimed at
rebuilding the SSB. In fact, our results indicate little to no
benefit from an MSL if discard mortality rates exceed
50%. However, this result is conservative since the model
assumes that all fleets would remain active in the fishery.
This paper is not intended to describe how a manage-
ment scheme should be implemented; rather, it aims to
understand the biological and economic implications of
different management schemes and to provide a useful
tool for investigating optimal minimum size policies for
stocks that are threatened with overfishing. The case of
Pacific Bluefin Tuna is not an isolated one. Regulations
aimed at curbing the fishing of young individuals were
once a major source of contention in the Atlantic Bluefin
Tuna fishery, when extremely high catches of juveniles in
the Mediterranean were causing considerable stock
declines. Today, these regulations are fully endorsed by
member nations of the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and have been successful
at helping to rebuild SSB (Webster 2011; Fromentin et al.
2014). In a fishery as important and complex as that tar-
geting Pacific Bluefin Tuna, it is especially helpful to be
able to determine a priori whether a regulation is likely to
benefit the rebuilding of the stock so that the contracting
parties are not negotiating in vain. Based upon our
FIGURE 8. Comparison of the short-term pain and long-term gains
associated with different phased-in approaches to implementing minimum
size limit (MSL) regulations in the Pacific Bluefin Tuna fishery across the
100 simulation runs (using assumptions from the base case scenario;
%SSB0 = spawning stock biomass [SSB] expressed as a percentage of
unexploited SSB; %ΔDFR20 = percent change in discounted future
revenues of the fishery over a 20-year period after implementation).
“Rebuilding years” refers to the delay in the time it takes the fishery to
produce yield that exceeds the status quo (i.e., no MSL in place).
FIGURE 9. Optimal minimum size limits (MSLs) for the three-phase
approach to implementing MSL regulations in the Pacific Bluefin Tuna
fishery across 20 of the 100 runs; each line represents a different run
(using assumptions from the base case scenario).
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analysis, it is evident that the Pacific Bluefin Tuna fishery
has the potential to be a more profitable and sustainable
enterprise, and although rebuilding will come at a high
cost in the short run, a phased-in management approach
could be used to mitigate the pain.
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